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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Claim againt the City of Moab by an Assignee of 
Davis C. HoldeJ', a former contract engin-eer for the City 
of Mc•::i.b for funds paid Ly the City to Davis C. Holder. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court entered judgment against the City of 
Moab in the favcr of tl1e Plaintiff for funds which had 
been paid to its former c.:ontrnct engineer at a time when 
the City Council and City Rt>corder had no knowledge of 
an assignment to a Trustee for th-2 birnefit of the Plaintiff 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Ar_ipellant seeks a complete 11::versal of the trial court's 
determination. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case have never be2n a matter of dif-
ference and ti-ie case vrns p1·esented to th2 Court largely 
for an interpretation of the law ;c,s applied to the facts. 
The Mayor of the: City of Moab, (K. E. McDougald) 
on Aprl~ 14, 1961. without the consent or knowledge of the 
City Recorder m- City Council, signed an acknowledgment 
(at fl12 :request of Davis C. Holder, whc was, at the time, 
a contract engineer for the City of Moab) of an assign-
ment from Holdee to a Trustee for the benefit of Plaintiff. 
The assignment was not known to the City Council or City 
Recorder until L0cembcr l !)()2 after the allic:g2d obligation 
was cr~'ttecl and :1cilher the agre-em'nt for th eessignment 
nor the assignmPnt were ever atteRkd to by the City Re-
corder as require:d by law. 
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Nr, moneys were paid by the City of Moab to Davis 
C. HolJer for services rendered by him on behalf of the 
City afcer the City Recorder and Council were notified by 
representative::; of Cleon B. Cooper, Executrix of the Estate 
of Joseph W. Cooper, of ths existrence of said assignment 
in December 19G2. After December 1962 all moneys due 
Davis C. Holder from th>e City ·werie· paid to William E. 
Foster as TrusteE- as provided in the assignment. 
It is admitted by the City that moneys equal to 
the ::i.monnt of th2 judgment were paid to Davis C. Holder 
by the City between the date of the assignment and the 
month of December 1962, at which later dat2 the Recorder 
and City Council learned of the ::i.ssignment and the ack-
nowledgment [ nd receipt of same by th2 Mayor of Moab. 
The sums so paid to Davis C. Holder between the date of 
the H3Jignment and D2cember 1962 are the subject matter 
of this action. 
No claim or attempt to satisy the provisions of Sec-
tion HJ-7-77, Ut~h Code Annotated, 1953, which requires 
that ::i. claim be presented to the governing body as a con-
dition precedent to maintaining an action 2gainst the City, 
has ever, at any time, been presented to the City Council. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
Th-e Mayor of a third class City in the State of Utah 
has only the power conferred upon him by statute and 
cannot act outside that authority in a manner that will 
c•.·eatE' a financial obligation 2gainst the City. 
Voltm11t' 10 of McQuillin Municipal Corporations 3rd 
4 
Edition, page 175, par::: graph 2!) 05 stat€s: 
"Laws pr•JViJe, in substance, that no county, city, 
town vilL1gc. townsltip, school district or other mu-
nicinal corp,1ra:tLon sha 11 m;'ke any contract unless 
the ,c;ame shall be within the scope of its powc:rs or be 
expressly authoriz0d by law, nor enless such contract 
sh2ll be madt upon a consideration wholly to be pe·r-
formed or executed subs,cquent to the making of the 
contract, R<striction!". on power to contract are de-
signed to protect the public rather than those who con-
tr:wt with the municipality." 
ParJ.graph 2!),lfJ, page 213, Volum2 10 of McQuillin 
Munici!-'~1 CoriJornhons 3rd Edition states: 
"\Vto may ~'.ct in beh2lf of a municipality? The of-
firer, body or board duly aut;1orized must act in be-
half of the municipality, otherwise a valid contract 
cannot be cr-eated, Generally the power to make con-
~r2c~s on Le}~alf of a municipality i·ests in the council, 
or i:1 case of a county, the board of supervisors, or the 
cou.1ty judges, which, hovvever (and this appli-es to all 
boards) must act at a legal meeting as a board, since 
t'he individual members acting singly have no author-
ity to bind the rnunid1Jality. It is wdl settled that the 
members :if c: common council, board or committee 
cannot separately and individually enter into a con-
tn~c~ which will bind the municipality but they may 
act as a hody at a regula1· or .~.p-ecial meeting of wMch 
such notic~~ !"hall haw. been given as required by law. 
*""''The city manager or mayor has only power to con-
tract as is conferred upon him by statute or the char· 
ter of the council, although it is usual to require cer-
tai;1 coutructs to lw approved by the mayor, and in 
.such case hC' must ajlpl'O\€ the co11tr2.ct or it may be 
pa,:;~ed over his v€to. ~ 
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'f'he (~[ah statutes on the subject v2st the operation of 
city gfJvernment in the Mayor and City Council. Section 
10-6-3 Utah Co<le Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"10-6-3. CiLies of third cla.ss.-Th2 municipal govern-
ment in cities of the third c'ass is vested in a mayor 
and city council to b-2 composed of fiv2 councilmen, to 
be elected at iargie .. " 
S8ction 10-6-5, Utah Code Annontated, 1953 provides: 
"10-6-5. Boards and councils ~- s legislative and govern-
ing Lodie.;; -Tne board of commission·ers in citic:s of the 
firnt and second class, the mayor and council in 
ciLic.s of third class and the board of trustees in towns 
are and shall be the legislative and gov::rning bodioes 
of SLlCh ciLics and towns, and as such shall have, ex-
e1·cise and discharge all of the rights, powers, privil-
>E'g::·s and avthority conferred by Jaw upon their re-
spective cities, towns or bodies, and shall perform all 
daties that may be required of them by law." 
S1,:c:tion 10-b-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, i;rovidre·s: 
"10-li-9. Meetings of governing bodies-Proe2dure. The 
E: ard of commissior.ers, city council and board of trust-
e" ~hall sit vv:th open doors and ke1::p a journal of their 
own proceedmgs. The yeas and nays Eohall be tak•en 
up·m the passage of all ordinan~es and an :-rnpositions 
to cieate any liability against the city or tcwn, and 
in all other cases at the request of any member, which 
sr1 all be eutered upon the j onrnal of its rroC>2edings. 
The concurrence of a majority of the members elected 
~hail he netessary to the passage of any such ordin-
ance or proposition. Where there are :m even number 
of memb:rs the consent or concurrence of one half of 
the member;:; shall be sufficient to confirm an appoint-
ment or concu in the n~mova·l of an appointed officer." 
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Section 10-6-Z4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"10-6-24. Powers and duties of mayor.-In cities of the 
third class th2· mayor shall preside at all meetings of 
the city counl'.il, but shall not vote except in case of a 
tie when he shl'll giv1: the casting vote. He may exer-
cise within the city limits the powe.r to suppress disol'."-
der and keep the peace, and may r::mit fines and for-
fei tm.·es and release any person imprisoned for viola-
tion of any city ordinance, but he shall report any such 
remission and release \Vith the reasons therefor to the 
cit;_v council at its n-ext session. He shall perform all du-
ties prescribed by law or ordinance and shall see the. t 
the Iaws and o~·dinances are faithfully executed. He 
may at any time examine and inspect the books, re-
cordi" and papers of any officer of, or agent employed 
by the city. He si)rnll from time to tim2 give the council 
information concernng the affairs of the city, and 
shall rec<Jmm~nd for their consideration such meas-
ures as he may deem expedient. He may when neces-
sary call upon ewry male inhDbitant of th city over 
the :tge of twenty-one years to aid in enforcing the 
laws and ordinances and in suppressing riots and oth-
er disorderly eonduct." 
In the case of New.s Advocate Pub. Co. v ... Cai,bon 
County, ~69 P, J 29, 72 Utah 88 the Supreme Court of the 
State 0f Utah recognized t1hie· genieral rule of law in the fol-
lowing language'. 
"(i) The genervl principa1 or rule of law that munici-
1pal corporations are not bound by contracts made 
wiUrnut authority or in excess of the powers of such 
ccrporations is conceded. The rule applicable is stated 
in l.J C. J. 540 as follows: "A county is not bound by 
a c.:intract hFyond the scope of its powers or foreign to 
ii s purposes, or which is outside of the authority of 
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the »fficers making it. In this connc:ction it is the rule 
th;:~ th2 aur}1ority of a county boa''d to make contracts 
i.s c:trictly iimiterl to thd co;~forrerl, •either expressly 
or impliedly, by statute, regai·dless of benefit to the 
cowd~r or of valu~ received; and lhe same is true as 
1.o other c:onnty officers altempting to contract in be-
hal[ of th'° county. '**All perwns rlealing with offic-
er:~ or &gents of counties al"e bound to ascertain the 
lirnas of lheir authority or pow::.r as fixed by statu-
t,Jry or organic law, and are ctargeabJ.e with knowledge 
of such limits. No estop~1el can oe cv::ated by the acts 
of such agents or officers in excess of their statutory 
com:;titutional powers." 
In the instal"~t case the Plzintiff is trying to enforce 
the tums of a contrnct or bind ~he City Council to pay 
moneys twice, once to the contracting engine'2r who is out-
sid-e the jurisdiction of this Court and ·who was paid before 
the guvt>rning l;cdy had knowledge of t}1e assignment and 
again to the :1egligent Plaintiff. who did not •;:v-en noti-
fy the City Cccmcil or the City R·2corder of the execution 
of the a.ssignrnu.t until December 1962 aftior which the 
City did abide ty its terms. 
Th: Supr2me Court of the State of Utah in the case 
of Parad·2e v. Salt Lake County, 118 P 122, 39 Utah 482 
:recognizr.s that "where the power to contract upon thr2 sub-
ject nu<.ter is withheld from a corporation or where the 
staiuu~ ,expl'' sse'1 a specific method of making the con-
1 met 1 h~n liabiiity does not arise by implication." 
POINT II 
Under the provisions of 10-10 .61, Utah Code, Annota-
ted, 19S:~. every contract made on behalf of the City or 
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to whi~h the City is a party is void unless signed by the 
City Recorder. 
Tht provision of the statute is written into law for 
the purpose of insuring that the governing body is aware 
of contracts which may effect public funds. 
Section 10-10-61. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"10~10-61: City R·oor:rder, Duties with respect to con-
tr~icts. He shall countersign a11 contracts made on be-
haif of the City, and every contract made on behalf 
of the city or to v-vhich the city is a party shall be 
vcid as sigr.ed by the v2corder. He sha11 maintain a 
record of all con tracts, properly ind-exed, which be open 
to the inspection of all interested persons.'' 
Dynamic Industri2s Co. v. City of Long Beach, 323 
P. 2nd 768, 159 C. A. 2nd 294. In this case there was a re~ 
quiremu1t of 1a>11 which provided: __ ."The City of Long 
Beach [·hall not be and is not bound by any contract except 
as 0H1erwis12 provided herein, unless the same is in writ-
ing, by order of the City Council, and signed by the City 
Managt>r or by some person in behalf of the City author-
ized to do so by the City Manager, provided, that the· ap~ 
proval d the form of the contract by the City Attorney 
shall be endorsed thereon before· the same shaH be signed 
in behalf of the city." 
" ( l, 2) The contract whose validity plaintiff seeks to 
establish was not signed by the city manager, as the 
ch:uter requires. It could not have been .signed since 
the <trea to he irn:luded was never defined nor approv· 
ed vy the city a ttnrney or the council. It is well settled 
that when a municipal charter contains an express 
limiration upon the mode in which the city may con-
tract, the e i ty is bound only by contract executed in 
ae:c'.'lrdance with t~e charter provi1sions; in other words, 
v;here the statute provides thre only mode by which 
t11:e power to contract shall be exercised, the mode is 
the m::asurt:: of the power. Reams v. Cooley, 171 Cal. 
150, 152 P. 293; Times Publishing Co. v. Weatherby, 
139 Cal. 618, 73 P. 465. The rule applies equally to con-
tracts made by the city in a governmentwl or a pro-
p1·ietary fm1ction. City of Pasadena v. Estrin, 212 Cal. 
231, 298 P. 14. Wli112n the charter provision has not 
been compiied with, the city may not be held liable in 
quasi contrvct, and it will not be estopped to deny the 
validity of the conract. Reams v. Cool1ey, supra, 171 
Cal. 150, 153, 152 P. 293; Los Angeles Dredging Co. 
v. City of Long Beach, 210 Cal. 348, 353, 291 P. 839, 
71 A. L. R. 161. :" 
'I'he Utah law in the ·case before the court requires all 
i:ontract:;;: made L•y the City to be attested by the City Re-
corder 0r in the alternative declares them to be absolutely 
void. Surely the legislature of this state in eruacting such 
a limitation on municipalities contemplated the very prob-
1em bf'fcre the court in this caS12· and made such a provi-
sion to pl'Otect the general public from a single designing 
mayor who might put personal gain above civic duty. 
All persons contracting with a municipal corporation 
must at the.fr peril, inquire into the statutory power of 
the corpcration or of its officers who make the contract. 
C11.y of Oakland v. Key Stystem, 149 P 2d, 195; 64 
C A. 2d 427: 
"(8-10) When the grant of a franchi.Sie· is in iexcess of 
powns of the grantor, there is no obligation on its 
part to restore any real or supposed benefits. It is 
scarcdy ni2·cessary to observe that no contract can be 
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made by a corporation which is prohibited by its 
charter or by the statute law of the State. And it is 
gieneral and fundamenlal principa<l of law that all per-
sonB contr;irting with a municipal corporation must 
at their peril inquire into the statutory power of the 
corporation or of its officers to make the contract; 
and a contract bcyonu t,hoe scop12 of the corporate pow-
er granted or conferred by the legislature expressly, 
or hy fair implication, is void, although it be under 
the s1eal of the corporation." 
The statute requiring all municipa;l corporations con-
tracts to be in writing and attested to by the City Record-
er is well conceived and founded on tbe proposition that 
some s~irt of ch('Ck is necessary to protect the public. If 
this were not so u coniving mayor or single City Council-
man could bankrupt a city by his simpk acknowledgment 
that an 3ssignml·nt had been made between two strangers 
which act would, if the district court's theory is upheld, ob-
ligate t~te City to pay twice for the same service although 
there were no compliance with the state kws governing 
all city ~ontracts and although no notice were given to the 
duly constitute<l governing body of the municipality. 
The argumeut of the Plaintiff would relieve the as-
signor and <::Rsignee of any obligation to notify the gov-
erning b0dy of the fact that the assignment had been 
made :1 1 H! relieve them of any obligation to see that the 
statutu1·y requir•:ments of the Utah law had been wmplied 
with :w<l would open the door to unscrupulous combina-
tions cf persons who might seek to fleece the unsuspect-
ing taxpayer. 
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POINT III 
G•mpljanc-e with (bbe prtiv1s11ons( of Seetion 10-7...f77 
Ubh C:Jde Annotated, 1953 is a condition precedent to the 
mainiemrnce of a claim against the City and failure to 
comply ~s sufficient bar and answer to any action or pro-
cessing against thoe City. 
SPc".:ion 10-'/-77, Utah Code· Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"10-7-77. Time for presenting .... Contenrts-Condition pre-
cedent to action. Every daim against a city or incor-
porated town for damages or injury, alleged to haw 
been caused by the defective, unsafe, dangerous or 
obstruckd condition of any street, alley, crosswalk, 
sid-c·walk, culvert or bridge of such city or town, or 
from the negligencie· of the city or town authorities in 
resprct to any such street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, 
cnlvert or bridge, shall within thirty days after the 
h::tpr·ening of such injury or damage be presented to 
the board of commissioners or city council of such 
boarJ of trustees of such town, in writing, signed by 
the claimant or by some person authorized to sign thie 
same, and properly verifieid, stating the particular 
time at whkh the injury happened, snd designating and 
de::wrihing the particular place in which it oocured, and 
also particularly describing the cause and cireumstanc, 
es of the· injury or damages, and sitating, if known to 
clamant, the name of the person, firm or corporation, 
who created, brought about or maintained the defect, 
olJptruction or condition causing such accident or in-
jmy, and tte nature and probab1e extent of such in-
jur.>" and the amount of damages claimed on account 
of the sarn"; such notice shall be sufficient in the par-
tic;iiars above specified to enahle the officers of such 
city or town to find the place and cause of such injury 
f.1:om the description thereof givien in the notice itself 
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without extraneous inquiry, and no action shall be 
mainbinea ~gain"t any city or town for damages or 
injury to person or property, unless it appears that 
the claim for w,hich th:: <.ction was brought was pre-
sented as aforesaid. cind that such governing body did 
not within nmety da:vs thereaft€r audit and allow the 
same. Every cJaim, other than claims above mention-
ed, against any city or town must be presented, pro-
perly itemized or described and verified as to correct-
ness by the claimant or his agent, to the governing 
body within one year after the last item of such ac-
count or cioim accrued, and if such account or claim 
is not properly er sufficiently itemized or described or 
vedfied, the governing body may require the same to 
be made more specific as to itemized or description, 
or to be correted as to the verification thereof." 
Section 10-7-78, Uta,h Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"10-7-78. Failure to file, a bar•Amendlment of 
claim. It shall be a sufficient bar r.nd answer to any 
action or prooaeding against a city or town in any 
court for the collectiun of any clnim mentioned in Sec-
tion 10-7-Ti, that such claim had not been presented 
to the governing body of suc,h city or town in the man-
ner and wifoin the time specified in Section 10-7-77; 
provided that in case an account or claim, other than 
a claim made for damages on account of the unsafe, 
defE:ctive, dang>erous or obstructed condition of any 
street, alley, crosswalk, way, sidewalk, culvert or 
bridge, is required by thP governing body to be made 
more spwdfic as to itemization or description, or to be 
pro~f'rly vcr:fiecL sufficient time shall he a.Jlowed the 
claimant to comply with such requirement." 
Section 78-12-.'30 U1 ah Code Annotmt,2d, 1953, provides: 
"78-12-.'30. Actions on claims against county, city 
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<JI' town. -AC;tions on claims against a county, city or 
inc:orp<Jrated tovrn, -vviriich have been i--ejected by the 
b·~::a·d of cocmty commissioners, city commissioners, 
city councii or board of truste2s, as the case may be, 
must be co1Pmenced ·within on•e year after the first 
re.i edion thereof by such board of county or city com-
mis3ioners, city council or board of trust!Ces." 
Tn-:re is absolutly HO allegation in Plaintiff's com-
plaint ul' proof mad2 or any eontention on the part of the 
Plaindt that she has ev-er, at any time, undertaken to com-
ply wi~n Section 10-7-77 0f the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
but the Plaintiff s1t:ems content to rest her entire case on 
the no~1ce given to the ~ayor of Moab, who had no author-
ity to biad the City, and who did not notify the City Coun-
cil or m2 City H.ecorder of the Assignment. This issue was 
raisect "Y Appellr,nt Defelldant in its first lefense and was 
argued 
Cornplianc•e with Section 10-7-77, Utaih Code Annotat-
ed, 1953, has c0:-isistently bo:en held by the Utah Supreme 
Court Lo :i condition precedent to the maintenance of a 
claim :igainst a City and failure to file such a claim a de-
fense anci bar to an action agDinst the City. 
Huriey v. Town ·of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213. 
T!1e court quoted the sbtutes and statied "The stat-
utes <',Jove quoted and previous statutes relating to the 
same ,.,Jhjed have b?en controlling factors in numerous 
det·is)c.u,; by the Cuurt. Connor v. Salt Lake City, 28 Utah 
:H~ 7~ Pac. 479; Macke? v Salt Lafoe City, 29 Utah, 247, 
81 P«;·. 81, 4 Ann. Cas. 824; Bowman v. Ogden City, 33 
Utah ) %, 93 Pac 561; BroWJ~ v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah, 
222, 9:1 Pac. f>IO. 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 619, 126 Am. St. Rep. 
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828, 14 Ann. Ca,s. 1004; Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah, 
306, 13,4 Pac. 1167; Dahl v. Salt Lafue City, 45 Utah, 544, 
14'7 Pac. 622; Berger v. Sall Lake City. 56 Utah, 403, 191, 
Pac. 233, 13 A.L.R. 5.***" 
The court then quotes from a case where a minor 
claimed to be exempt from the statute stating: "The lan-
guagP, quoted is typieal of expressions generally employed 
by the cou:ds in cases last cited. They not only consti-
tute the overwhelming weight of authority, but, in the 
opinion 0f the w1·!ter, they are more consonant with reason 
and the purpos12 of the statube which peremptorily requires 
that th(, claim be p1·esented as therein provided. As fre-
quentiy suggest.ed in the decisions referred to, there being 
no exception in the statute itself, it is the duty of the 
courts to interpret the law as they find it and not resort 
to jud1d&l loeg~slation, and thereby probably defeat the 
manifest purpose of the law." 
HJ.milton v. Salt Lake City, 106 P. 2d 1028, 99 Uta'h 
362. 
'fbe court stated: 
"(2) Section 15-7-77 is a limitation statute for failure 
to file a claim in the manner and within the time specified 
in sedi::>n 15~7-57." It is a sufficient bar and answer to any 
action :for the oollection of any claim under the first part 
of the Jlatute. Undoer the second part of the section if the 
claimanc is required by the governing body to be more 
specific a.s to itemization or description, or if the claim 
is not properly v12rified, suffici€nt time shal1l be allowed 
to comply with such requirements. No provision is made 
for the 1-;overning body to make such a flequirement from 
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:<claimant uncle1 the first part of the :oee:tion. See Husband 
v. Salt Lake City, 82 Utah 449. 69 P. 2d 491, at page 497. 
·' \0, 4) The right to recover damag1~s is statutory, it 
can on:y be avJ.ilecl of v/~1en chere has been a COJJlpliance 
with th'~ conditions upon wl11ch the right is conferned. 
Hu,Jer ,'. Towii of Biniham, 63 Ut:1:1 589, 228 P. 213. 
vVhere ; right ls y::urely statutory and is gnmtoed upon con-
ditions. 'me ',vJ10 seek;:; tc enfore:e the rigM must by alle-
~~ation ;:;,c I p, oc:f ln'ing :1imseli w1~, m the conditions. John-
:;on v. City of Glrndale, 12 Cal L_ p. 2cl 389, 55 P. 2d 580." 
"***U is th•e generally a2c2pt'ccl 1ule that a municipality 
and ;ts officers ae without r;ower to ·waive compliance 
with tne law in snch matters. C?iapman v. City of Fulkrton, 
J0 Cal .App. 4n. 26S P. 1035; S~:-rncer v. City of Calipatria, 
supra ( ( Cal. App. 2d 267, 49 P 2d 320) ; Touhey v. City 
.if Dec1 I 1ir, su1 ra ( 175 Incl 98, 93 N.E. 540, 32 L.R.A., N.S., 
350); Dechant v City cf Hays JI2 Yan 729. 212 P. 682; 
Berry v. City c.~ :tl"'lena. 56 Mone. 122, 182 P. 117. The stat-
1.ite n1,c,o i10t auctinrize a vY2ivrr nor does it ~n·ovide any 
subsb ln ! e for a '.\Tit Len vc: ~,·ific1 c · ai,-;1. The z uthorities we 
(rnve .i.ut q11ite generally ·hold that actuJ.l knowledge on 
Lle p·.,1·t of offir'.er-; of a mnn'.c;jp2.1ii1y of fee facts required 
t' c2 l:.te~1 in thf claim ctoes 11'.JC dispense with the claim 
itself. 
*·" 'Tiie anov·2 quoted .~ne states in anoth<?r portion of 
1. '·e 01;i1>1u11 · "'1 h'.~ Hl31 ?C'1 n·r1.1lrc ;'rss2nhtion of a ver-
ified e:i~·im to th1 cle1'k 01 srcrctmy cf the J.cogislative body 
. r 1:1t> r:w1,i~i''«ti'I:'" .·1· •.i1he" •river <:ic" 1:'Joc1 ·1 >.vi'hin ninety 
1l 1vs ·:f"~r illl' ;iccident '.-i!ts :ccunec'. It stE~··es no excep~ 
t]ons, end we at'P unable to b. lie-.·e th? t any were intended. 
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If tht-re were to be exceptions, they should have been, stat-
ed in be act itself. It is not for the courts to create them. 
It must be presun:ed that the Legis,lature would have made 
disabiEty an excuse for failure to present a claim had it 
been intended to grant that privilege. There is nothing 
novel in this class of 1-egislation. Wherever liability of mu-
nicipalities for negligence is :ri:-cognized, general laws, char-
ter pr(•visions, 01 ordimnc<es will be found imposing condi-
tions u:ton the assertion of claims for damagee, and many 
such are discussed in the books which are far more rigor-
ous tha.i1 our own statute." 
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CONCLUSION 
1 Tile M~.yor could not bind the City of Moab in such 
z; ·way lhat it ~hr>uld be required to p~y an assignee sums 
which hacl been paid to th2 assignor nt a time when the 
governing body :::nd City Recorder had no knowledge or 
mforrn?trion that an assignment had boeen made. 
2. The Plaintiff assignee cannot recoviEr on a contract 
that the legisla.Lure has declared void because it was not 
executed in the manner provid2d by law. 
3. Plaintif1 has not alleged or proved facts which en-
dUe ter to the relief sought because no claim was ever 
pr-esen~ed to t!1e City Council as required by statute and 
failure· 1.u file w ·h a claim is by statute made a bar and 
sufficient defense to the maintenance of this action. 
